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The landmark study of Chiswick (1978) on the transferability of human capital
to the destination country’s labor market triggered a sizable empirical literature
investigating the wage assimilation of immigrants towards the labor income of
comparable natives.1 An important aspect of the economic success of immigrants,
which to our knowledge has not yet been well investigated, should be the job allo-
cation mechanism on the host country’s labor market. In this study we try to shed
some light on this issue by analyzing the impact of job entry restrictions on the
economic integration of ethnic German immigrants who entered Germany after
the fall of the iron curtain.
A characteristic feature of the German labor market is its very rigid allocation
of workers to jobs. Particular work certiﬁcates or occupational licenses are typ-
ically required to exercise a large number of occupations, often they are even a
legal prerequisite. These degrees are mainly obtained in the so called dual system
of apprenticeship, a form of vocational training in which participants are educated
half of the time in a company, the other half in speciﬁc vocational schools run by
the government. Depending on the type of education - approximately 300 voca-
tions are distinguished - and the schooling degree of the apprentice the vocational
training lasts between 2 and 3.5 years. Since the vocational programs are very
speciﬁc, degrees obtained are not easily transferred to other occupations.2
As a consequence of these institutional features of the German labor market, re-
quired qualiﬁcations of a job should play a major role in explaining observed wage
diﬀerences across workers. This consideration is formalized in the job competition
theory (Thurow, 1975) which even assumes that required skills determine wages
completely. Any additional human capital possessed by employees thus generates
no additional return. This approach is fundamentally diﬀerent from the more
prominent human capital theory (Becker, 1975), postulating that labor income is
mainly determined by the acquired skills of the employee. These are assumed to
be perfectly known to ﬁrms and rewarded at their marginal product. Sattinger
(1993) discusses assignment models that take into account demand and supply
side factors to explain the allocation mechanism on labor markets, thereby bring-
ing together these two polar cases. These models further motivate the question of
the importance of the match between required and acquired skills in determining
wages. The empirical literature evaluating the impact of job mismatches - the
incidence of workers having higher or lower education than demanded by their
1For a survey of the German evidence see Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann, and Zwintz (2005).
2See Müller, Steinmann, and Ell (1998) for a more detailed description of the German edu-
cational system and its importance for labor market entry.
4employer - on earnings diﬀerentials was started by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981).
Largely drawing on the theory of the transferability of human capital (Chiswick,
1978), we develop hypotheses why immigrants should be particularly prone to job
mismatches upon arrival and why we should observe an assimilation to natives’
lower mismatch probabilities with years of residence. Closely related to this issue,
we further argue that immigrants should be more likely to begin their work career
on the host labor market in jobs requiring lower skills than jobs comparable natives
occupy. Yet, we expect them to access similar job positions as natives after an
adjustment period. The capability of immigrants to enter employment positions
according to their vocational skills should be decisive for a successful economic
integration in host societies whose labor markets are characterized by strong ties
between vocational skills and job accessibility, just as it is the case in Germany.
Only if immigrants eventually are employed according to their degrees, their wages
will assimilate to the levels of comparable natives, given that required qualiﬁca-
tions are as decisive for the returns to education as is assumed by job competition
theory as well as assignment models.
The group of immigrants under study, ethnic Germans who entered Germany
after the fall of the iron curtain, is of interest for at least two reasons. One is
the sheer number that arrived since the late eighties. According to Zimmermann
(1999), about 800,000 immigrants of German ethnicity entered the country in 1989
and 1990 alone. The second interesting fact is their German ancestry due to which
they enjoy a special legal status compared to other immigrants.3 Most importantly,
upon arrival in the country they are granted German citizenship. Secondly, they
are eligible to attend free language classes and speciﬁc vocational courses. Thirdly,
the German government entitles ethnic German immigrants to apply for an oﬃ-
cial recognition of their educational certiﬁcates (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, 2001).
This policy was implemented to upgrade the value of these degrees obtained in the
non-market economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the German
labor market and is of particular interest to this study.
In our empirical application, utilizing twelve waves from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP), we test the hypotheses outlined above. We compare
the job mismatch probabilities and the propensity of natives and ethnic Germans
who immigrated since 1988 to be employed in jobs requiring varying levels of ed-
ucation. In the second step of the analysis, we assess the impact of controlling for
these factors on the wage assimilation proﬁle of ethnic German immigrants in a
3For a brief overview of the history of ethnic German migrants see among others Schmidt
(1996) or Zimmermann (1999).
5Mincer-type wage regression framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section
we outline the main ideas and implications of human capital transferability and
investment. We continue by developing hypotheses about the relevance of labor
market conditions on the integration process of immigrants, and brieﬂy review
the evidence about the immigration experience of ethnic Germans. Section 3
details the empirical strategy comprising the data description and the econometric
models. Our results are presented in Section 4.I n Section 5 we draw some
conclusions.
2 Theory and Evidence
2.1 Human Capital: Transferability and Investment
The seminal paper of Chiswick (1978) develops a theory on the transferability
of immigrants’ human capital acquired in their home country to the labor mar-
ket of the destination society. He further derives implications for human capital
investments after arrival and how the labor income of immigrants relative to na-
tives should evolve with time of residence. This study started a rich empirical
literature on the wage assimilation of immigrants. Further important contributors
to the theoretical literature, among others, are Borjas (1985), pointing out the
importance of the diﬀerence between immigrant cohorts, as well as Duleep and
Regets (1997b, 1999) who develop a formal model of human capital investment
highlighting the eﬀects of imperfect human capital transferability. In what follows
we brieﬂy outline the major arguments of the transferability of human capital and
then, in some more detail describe the contribution of this study to the literature.
The starting point of Chiswick (1978) is the observation that immigrants are
typically disadvantaged on the destination countries’ labor market vis-à-vis na-
tives upon arrival since they lack several marketable characteristics that generate
monetary returns. Among these are what is often referred to as country-speciﬁc
human capital comprising language skills and knowledge about customs in the
host society. Furthermore, the education they possess might not meet the host
society’s standards or might be simply outdated if the immigrant originates in
a technologically less developed country. Another factor hampering immigrant’s
labor market prospects might be the lack of knowledge of the domestic labor mar-
ket’s functioning and optimal job search methods. Finally, in many cases it might
be very diﬃcult and costly for a company to evaluate the quality of foreign ed-
ucational certiﬁcates, reducing the chance for the immigrants to exploit acquired
6skills eﬃciently on the labor market. On labor markets such as in Germany this
might have severe consequences on their earnings potential.
All the points stated so far, drawing mostly on Chiswick (1978), imply that
upon arrival immigrants are faced with a labor market disadvantage that should
manifest itself in lower earnings (and a higher unemployment probability) com-
pared to similarly trained natives. Qualitatively, the bigger the diﬀerences between
home and destination country in terms of development and technology as well as
culture and language, the lower should be the transferability of human capital and
hence the lower the wage upon arrival. On the other hand, the lower the valuation
of immigrants’ skills, the lower are as well the opportunity costs to devote time to
investment in further education (Duleep and Regets, 1997a). They further argue
that another incentive for immigrants to invest in education is the complementar-
ity of skills acquired in the home country to additional human capital obtained
after arrival.4 These skills should subsequently increase immigrants’ income by a
higher rate than the income of natives over the same stages of the life cycle, hence
a catch-up should be attainable.
Since the earlier in life an investment is made, the longer the investor can ben-
eﬁt from it, one should expect a steep assimilation proﬁle in the ﬁrst years after
arrival that ﬂattens out with years of residence in the host country. Furthermore,
those individuals suﬀering the most from imperfect transferability of their skills
upon arrival should experience the fastest catch-up process since their incentives
for additional human capital investments are strongest. Depending on the assump-
tions about the distribution of unobservable characteristics, for instance cognitive
ability and motivation, and how they vary between immigrants and natives, full as-
similation of immigrants to the native wage levels might or might not be achieved.5
The catch-up might further be hampered by systematic discrimination against im-
migrants through employers.6
The empirical evidence evaluating human capital transferability and invest-
4If, for instance, skills initially cannot be applied due to insuﬃcient knowledge of the domestic
language, improving communication skills is obviously complementary to this education as it
will eventually enable the immigrant to work in the profession trained for. Furthermore, if the
qualiﬁcation acquired in the home country is outdated and therefore not rewarded on the host
labor market, this knowledge should still be useful in acquiring the relevant skills to work in the
original profession, though utilizing the more modern technology prevalent in the destination
country.
5For various theories about skill diﬀerences between immigrants and natives as well as empir-
ical evidence see among others Borjas (1987), Chiswick (1978), Duleep and Regets (1997b), and
Dustmann (1993).
6Economic models of discrimination are surveyed by Altonji and Blank (1999).
7ment in general focuses on verifying the following hypotheses: do immigrants
suﬀer from an initial income disadvantage and, more importantly, do they catch
up to comparable natives with years of residency? This is typically investigated
in a human-capital-earnings framework augmented with an immigrant indicator
and a quadratic term of years since migration which should capture the initial
wage diﬀerential and the assimilation process, respectively. However, more direct
evidence on human capital investment of immigrants after arrival in a domestic
country is rather scarce. It therefore remains unclear what really is responsible for
observed wage assimilation proﬁles. Do immigrants really invest in additional job-
speciﬁc human capital such as on-the-job training, acquire language skills, start a
new vocation from scratch, or ﬁnd more adequate jobs as we will discuss below?
2.2 Job Mismatch and Skill Requirements
The empirical literature on job mismatches mainly focuses on overeducation re-
ferring to the case that a worker is higher educated than the job demands and its
impact on wages.7 In this study, however, we are more concerned with a diﬀerent
form of job mismatch. In particular, we analyze the probability of being employed
in an occupation not trained for.8 We develop several hypotheses why immigrants
should be particularly prone to such an employment situation upon arrival and
why their propensity to ﬁnd an appropriate job should increase and probably as-
similate to the level of natives. Most of this reasoning is straightforwardly implied
by the theory on human capital transferability discussed above. A second outcome
measure we analyze is the actual formal education required for the job currently
employed at. In a second step, we assess the impacts of both these measures on
wages.
Due to the imperfect transferability of their human capital, immigrants face
a disadvantage vis-à-vis natives whose skills are fully applicable. Secondly, immi-
grants have an incentive to invest in further human capital. In the meantime, it is
likely that they accept any temporal job, presumably unskilled and/or part-time,
that is oﬀered to them to maintain themselves and their family but not necessar-
ily one they were originally trained for. Additionally, if foreign degrees, at least
initially, are not recognized by employers, this should result in a relatively high
probability of a mismatch.9 Lacking information about how to optimally search
7See e.g. Hartog (2000) or Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) for an overview. Bauer
(2002) provides evidence for Germany.
8For a discussion of the determinants of such job mismatches and evidence for 13 European
countries we would like to refer to Wolbers (2002).
9Since ethnic German immigrants can apply for an oﬃcial recognition of the degrees ob-
8a job most likely also hampers the probability of ﬁnding an appropriate job. The
same arguments would imply that recent immigrants should on average work in
occupations that require less skills than the jobs ﬁlled by natives that are similarly
endowed with skills demanded on the labor market.
With years of residence, these disadvantages should gradually be reduced, re-
sulting in an assimilation to native mismatch rates. Considering the skill require-
ments of jobs, a catch up of immigrants towards the native average should also
be expected. Furthermore, if employers initially oﬀer only low-skilled jobs to im-
migrants due to the diﬃculties of evaluating their educational certiﬁcates, they
might be convinced by their work performance, subsequently accept the foreign
degrees, and adjust the job position and payment accordingly.10
Since immigrants acquired their skills according to the demands of their home
labor market, this might result in a higher likelihood of suﬀering from structural
mismatches (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, 2001), i.e. they most likely have a higher
probability than natives to possess skills not demanded on the host country’s labor
market. In consequence, the ’natural’ mismatch rate of immigrants should exceed
that of natives. An institutional reason for immigrants underachieving the propor-
tion of matching jobs compared to natives in welfare states like Germany might be
the limited access to unemployment beneﬁts. Whereas natives might turn down
a non-matching job oﬀer since they are ﬁnancially supported by generous welfare
payments, immigrants are less likely to be able to aﬀord such a behavior.11
Finally, if skill requirements and job mismatches depend on immigration status
as well as years of residency and in turn have an eﬀect on wages, then omitting
them from a wage regression should be partially reﬂected in the immigrants’ as-
similation proﬁle. Considering our deﬁnition of a mismatch and the hypothesis of
(at least initially) higher mismatch probabilities for immigrants, the initial wage
disadvantage should be over- and the speed of assimilation be underestimated.
tained in their home countries this point might be less relevant for them if companies accept the
governmental judgments concerning the quality of the acquired education.
10This situation can be interpreted in the framework of statistical discrimination. Firms want
to hire and pay eﬃcient wages according to the productivity oﬀered to them by workers. How-
ever, they cannot directly observe productivity but have to rely on signals such as educational
certiﬁcates and work experience. The lower valuation of immigrants’ compared to natives’ skill
signals inclines employers to oﬀer lower wages to immigrants. Over time, ﬁrms collect more
information about the true productivity of their employees. This reduces the weight placed on
the initial signals when forming expectations about their true productivity. If migrants are as
productive as natives the wage gap should therefore gradually disappear.
11In the present analysis, however, this eﬀect is irrelevant since ethnic Germans are German
citizens and therefore have full access to welfare beneﬁts.
9The same is concluded considering job requirements.
2.3 Empirical Evidence for Ethnic German Immigrants
We commence this overview with evidence on wage assimilation of ethnic German
immigrants who entered Germany after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. A very
recent study by Fertig and Schurer (2007) utilizes 21 waves of the German Socio
Economic Panel (GSOEP) covering the period from 1984 to 2004. They follow
the standard modeling approach in the literature and estimate wage proﬁles by
the inclusion of an immigrant dummy and a quadratic years of residence term.
Due to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and estimation approaches, the authors predict full
assimilation of ethnic Germans who entered since 1988 to occur after between 9
and 12 years. The initial earnings diﬀerential of ethnic German immigrants is
estimated to be in the vicinity of 50 to 60 %.
In an earlier contribution, using two cross-sections from the ALLBUS, Schmidt
(1997) concludes that there are only negligible diﬀerences in the labor market per-
formance of immigrants of German ethnicity and German natives. The analyzed
data, however, stems from the years 1982 and 1990, hence mainly investigates im-
migrants who entered Germany before the soviet system collapsed. Interestingly,
the only slight indication of an earnings disadvantage is found for the most recently
arrived group of ethnic Germans who entered between 1986-1990, comprising some
of the ﬁrst immigrants analyzed in this study.
Using the ﬁrst wave of the foreigner sample of the GSOEP, Bauer and Zim-
mermann (1997) compare the economic performance of ethnic German immigrants
with immigrants from former East Germany (GDR) that entered between 1984 and
1994. They report no initial earnings diﬀerential between the two groups but ﬁnd
the wage incomes of ethnic immigrants to grow faster with years of residence from
which they draw the conclusion that east Germans invest less in human capital
after arrival. Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) further ﬁnd evidence that those
immigrants who had social networks in Germany before arrival earn signiﬁcantly
more than those who had no support of friends or family.
Finally, the paper by Kreyenfeld and Konietzka (2001) is the study which is
most closely related to the aspects raised in this paper in investigating the trans-
ferability of educational credentials of ethnic German immigrants and foreigners to
the German labor market, utilizing GSOEP data from 1998. First, they ﬁnd that
vocational and university degrees of both immigrant groups have no predictive
power for the employment probability whereas both these variables exhibit strong
10positive impacts for natives. Estimating a wage regression, their results further
suggest that only those individuals who work in a job trained for receive signiﬁcant
premiums on their education, whereas these premiums are considerably higher for
natives than for immigrants of German ethnicity. They conclude that entering
the professions they are trained for is the crucial threshold for immigrants to be
successful on the German labor market, however acknowledge that the observed
shares of migrants managing to do so are relatively low vis-à-vis German natives.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
In our empirical application we utilize twelve waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), covering the years 1994-2005.12 Our sample comprises male Ger-
man natives who were born in Germany and have the German citizenship since
birth and male ethnic Germans who entered Germany in 1988 or later. One of the
advantages of analyzing this particular group of immigrants is the fact that theo-
retically one could observe them in the GSOEP right after they arrive. However,
since the foreigner sample of the GSOEP was collected for the ﬁrst time in 1994,
all those immigrants who entered before that date are only identiﬁable after some
of the interesting human capital and labor market adjustments already occurred.
As a consequence, we end up with only 72 immigrant-year observations for the
ﬁrst ﬁve years since arrival in Germany. We therefore abstain from modeling the
assimilation proﬁles in the standard parametric way13, yet divide immigrants into
three categories: being in the country (i) for at most ﬁve years, (ii) for six to ten
years, and (iii) for more than ten years. Summary statistics of immigrants are
presented in this manner as well. Furthermore, we restrict our main sample to
employed respondents in the age range of 18 to 60.
Table A1 reports summary statistics of the dependent variables of the analysis.
The wage information consists of monthly real gross labor income (in terms of
Euros in 2000). The job mismatch indicator is one if a respondent is employed in
12The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v1.0 (Oct
2006) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu).
The following authors supplied PanelWhiz SOEP Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency,
John P. Haisken-DeNew (15), Markus Hahn and John P. Haisken-DeNew (31). The PanelWhiz
generated DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available
upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) describes PanelWhiz in detail.
13See as well the subsequent subsection.
11a profession not trained for14 and zero otherwise. For both these variables, huge
initial discrepancies between natives and immigrants are observable that diminish
with time of residence, yet are far from being eliminated after 13 years, the av-
erage duration of residence in the country of the last group. Finally, we report
employment by qualiﬁcation requirements. A cursory glance reveals that ethnic
German immigrants are more frequently employed in jobs requiring ﬁrm-speciﬁc
training such as Job Introduction, On-the-Job Training,a n dCourses15 (as well
as No Training at all) than natives. Nevertheless, these shares approach native
levels after more than ten years. Turning to Vocational Training this picture is
ﬂipped upside down with immigrants now assimilating from a lower level towards
the observed frequency of natives and even overshooting it slightly. Considering
jobs requiring academic degrees, a very substantial gap between natives and eth-
nic Germans exists and appears to persist over the observed horizon of years of
residence.
Table A2 documents the explanatory variables with Under 16 referring to the
share of ethnic German immigrants who entered Germany at compulsory school
age.16 Natives have on average a slight advantage in basically all labor market
characteristics (Years of Schooling, Work Hours, Part-time employment, and Job
Tenure).17 Furthermore, ethnic German immigrants are on average younger, more
frequently married, and live in larger households with more children than natives.
3.2 Econometric Models
To analyze the hypotheses outlined in Section 2.2, we specify three diﬀerent
econometric models. To evaluate the employment conditions of immigrants in
comparison to natives, we analyze the qualiﬁcation requirements (Q) of the current
job as well as the incidence of a job mismatch (M). Due to the categorical nature







jXit + δtj + cij +  itj i =1 ,...,N, t= 1994,...,2005 (1)
14This includes individuals currently in vocational training as well as workers that do not have
any education at all.
15Courses refers to the attendance of job speciﬁc training courses at the beginning of employ-
ment.
16To be precise, children in Germany have to attend school for nine years regardless of their
age. However, since most children enter schools at age six they are generally obliged to stay in
education until they are 15. Henceforth, we refer to immigrants who entered the country at age
15 or below (’at compulsory school age’) as the younger immigrants as well. Those immigrants
who were 16 or older when migrating are referred to as the older or the majority of immigrants.
17Work Hours denotes actual monthly work hours computed by multiplying weekly hours by
4.4.
12where j = {Q,M} and y∗
itj denotes a latent, continuous variable underlying the
observed outcomes yitj. Since we analyze an unbalanced panel with respondents
entering and exiting the data set at diﬀerent points in time, t does not run over
all twelve periods for each individual. Turning to the explanatory variables, Iit
is a vector of dummies indicating the status of the immigrant, including three
categories of years since migration and whether or not she immigrated at the
compulsory school age of 15 years or younger. Xit denotes a vector of control
variables comprising socio-economic and job speciﬁc factors such as age, marital
status, number of household members and children, years of schooling, federal state
dummies, ﬁrm size, ﬁeld of occupation dummies, job tenure, a part-time indicator,
and work hours. αj, βj, are parameter vectors measuring the impacts of the de-
scribed covariates that have to be estimated and δtj is a vector of time dummies.
cij is an individual-speciﬁc, time-invariant error component which we include to
capture unobservable factors such as cognitive ability or motivation. Finally,  itj
is assumed to be standard normal and uncorrelated with the regressors.
y∗
itj, the latent variables that are assumed to underly the observable categories





1 if τ<y ∗
itM
(2)
in the job mismatch model and by
yitQ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 if y∗
itQ ≤ τQ,1
2 if τQ,1 <y ∗
j ≤ τQ,2
. . .
7 if τQ,6 <y ∗
itQ
(3)
in the skill requirement model. The required skills are ordered from No Training
required coded 1 to University Degree coded 7. τ in the ﬁrst and τQ,1 <τ Q,2 <
···<τ Q,6 in the second model are threshold parameter that have to be estimated
along with the other model parameters. Equations (2) and (3) plus the normality
assumption of  itj gave rise to the (ordered) probit model which could be estimated
by maximum likelihood (ML)i fcij was observable. Since we consistently utilize
a speciﬁc approach to handle the unobservable, time-invariant error in all models,
we will describe it after introducing the wage regression.
In the second step of our analysis, we estimate the eﬀects of correcting for job
conditions on the wage diﬀerentials between ethnic Germans and natives. This is






WXit+δtW +ciW + it i =1 ,...,N, t= 1994,...,2005 (4)
13where yit denotes the natural logarithm of monthly gross wages and Cit is a vector
of controls consisting of the job mismatch indicator, and 6 dummies for the diﬀer-
ent levels of job requirement, leaving No Training as the base group. Xit and Iit
are deﬁned as above.18
By estimating the wage assimilation proﬁle using three dummies we deviate
from the standard approach in the literature that does so by an immigrant indi-
cator and a quadratic term of years since migration. We abstain from doing so
due to data considerations. As is depicted in Table A2 and brieﬂy discussed in
the preceding subsection, we have very few observations for the ﬁrst ﬁve years
after arrival, in particular for the ﬁrst two as the high mean of 4.3 years indicates.
Hence, we are worried that the imprecision with which we assess these ﬁrst years
might yield somewhat misleading estimates of the initial disadvantage as well as
the subsequent assimilation proﬁle. However, the disadvantage of our method is
that we cannot predict how many years are required to complete the assimilation
process if this is not achieved within the maximal observed number of years of
residency in the sample, in this case 18 years.
Let’s now turn to the individual-speciﬁc, time-invariant error component cij
(j = {Q,M,W}). Since we want to allow cij to be correlated with all other
right-hand-side variables in each model, random eﬀects is ruled out as a potential
estimation strategy. Fixed eﬀects approaches that fulﬁll this requirement suﬀer
from two important shortcomings in this setting. Firstly, it is impossible to iden-
tify the full vectors αj (j = {Q,M,W}) measuring the impacts of the immigration
status Iit, which is the main purpose of the analysis. Furthermore, these models
do not permit individual-speciﬁc, time-varying sample weights which are impor-
tant in our investigation to obtain estimates that are representative for these two
population groups.19
As an alternative to these approaches we therefore apply a speciﬁcation sug-
gested by Chamberlain (1984) and Mundlak (1978). Hence, we explicitly model
the correlation between cij and the right-hand-side variables in the following linear
fashion:
cij = ¯ X
 
iθj + rij (5)
18Xit additionally contains a dummy indicating current participation in vocational training.
This information is accounted for diﬀerently in the ﬁrst-step estimations as we explain when
discussing the empirical ﬁndings.
19The non-linear models further suﬀer from the problem that only those individuals can be
considered that exhibit variation over time in the outcome which imposes a non-random selection
criterion on the remaining subsample.
14with j = {Q,M,W}, ¯ Xi =1 /Ti
 
t Xit where Ti denotes the number of ob-
servations of respondent i in the sample, and rij is a random eﬀect such that
E[rij|Xit,I it]=E[rij]=0∀ t. Note that we explicitly rule out a correlation be-
tween cij and Iit, a necessary assumption to identify αj.20 However, we believe
that the amount of years spent in the host society and whether a migrant entered
Germany at an age of less than 16 years are most likely not correlated with un-
observable traits such as ability or motivation which would justify our assumption.
Plugging assumption (5) in models (1), and (4), respectively, suggests to utilize
random eﬀects estimators. Yet, due to the fact that random eﬀects speciﬁcations
do not allow individual sample weights, we estimate our models by pooled (or-
dered) probit and pooled OLS, respectively. These models are consistent, albeit,
less eﬃcient than the random eﬀects speciﬁcations. In order to obtain valid test
statistics, we compute White robust standard errors and additionally control for
individual clusters.
Doubt about the consistency of the obtained estimates might arise due to the
unbalanced nature of the analyzed panel. In fact, panel attrition might yield in-
consistent point estimates if this decision is non-random in the sense that it is
correlated with the considered outcomes as well as explanatory variables. Diﬀer-
ent variable addition tests suggested by Wooldridge (1995), however, indicate that
sample attrition is no concern in our data.21
4 Results
4.1 Job Positions and Job Mismatches
In Table 1 we report the marginal eﬀects of the length of stay of immigrants in
the host country and whether they entered at compulsory school age on being em-
ployed in jobs with diﬀering qualiﬁcation requirements. In panel A results for the
full sample are depicted, in panel B we exclude individuals currently enrolled in
vocational training. The required skills steadily increase from y =1indicating No
Training required to y =7referring to the necessity of holding a college degree.
Once again we control for the full set of demographic and labor market speciﬁc
controls outlined in Section 3.1, in particular years of schooling. A cursory look
at panel A reveals that all but two depicted eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant and
20Equation (5) additionally includes the term ¯ C
iγ when the wage regression is considered with
¯ Ci =1 /Ti
 
t Cit. Additionally, riW is assumed to be independent of Cit.
21These results are available upon request.
15that the employment probabilities of the majority of ethnic Germans for all job
categories approach those of comparable natives, though to a varying degree.
Whereas the estimated eﬀects are economically negligible when No Training is
required, they are substantial for jobs requiring training a worker obtains when
employed in the company but which are not a prerequisite of being hired. These
jobs comprise Job Introduction (y =2 ), On-the-Job Training (y =3 ), and Courses
(y =4 ). In all these categories immigrants have a higher employment probability
than natives during the ﬁrst ﬁve years which, however, diminishes substantially
after more than a decade in the country. These ﬁgures support the hypotheses
outlined in Section 2.2. Younger immigrants are somewhat less likely to work in
these employment categories and therefore more similar to natives than the older
group.
The ﬁnal three columns contain the marginal eﬀects on employment probabil-
ities of jobs usually requiring speciﬁc certiﬁcates or degrees, where y =5refers to
Vocational Training and y =6to Technical School. For all these jobs, employment
probabilities of ethnic German immigrants are lower than for comparable natives.
The biggest initial disadvantage of -16.1 % is found for vocational training stress-
ing the particularly severe problems for immigrants to obtain employment in this
highly restricted part of the labor market. Yet, on the other hand, these job po-
sitions also witness the largest catch-up, reducing this diﬀerential to merey -3.2
% on average after more than 10 years. The highest two job categories exhibit
moderate employment disadvantages for immigrants. A rather surprising result is
the ﬁnding that younger immigrants not only have a higher probability to work
in such jobs than the older group but that they also appear to be more likely to
be employed in jobs requiring a college degree than natives. However, a speci-
ﬁcation discarding individuals currently in vocational training (panel B) reveals
that this factor is partially responsible for the slightly odd results of immigrants
who entered the country at compulsory school age. While the general proﬁles of
employment probabilities are almost unaﬀected, the absolute magnitude of all im-
pacts estimated for younger immigrants is reduced for all categories.
To summarize results from Table 1, we ﬁnd support for our hypothesis derived
above. Many ethnic German immigrants start their careers in the host society
with jobs requiring little or no particular training and then, after adjusting their
human capital to the new labor market conditions, move out of these jobs and
into employment requiring higher qualiﬁcations, in particular vocational degrees.
This tendency might be augmented by an increasing knowledge of the labor mar-
ket with time spent in the country as well as the convincing job performance of
16immigrants letting them climb the job ladder. In general, the employment prob-
abilities across qualiﬁcation requirements seem to approach native levels and are
reduced to gaps of no more than 5 % for every group which is a very strong signal
of the integration capability of ethnic German immigrants. Probably, the entitle-
ment to receive an oﬃcial recognition of the degrees received in the home countries
contributes to these results. Finally, it appears that immigrants who arrived in
Germany at compulsory school age are more similar to natives than the majority
of immigrants with the exception of the employment propability of jobs requiring
vocational training.
The results for the incidence of a job mismatch are depicted in Table 2. Column
(1) contains marginal eﬀects utilizing the full sample. In column (2) we exclude
workers enrolled in vocational training since per deﬁnition of the data they are all
mismatched. The probability of a job mismatch of immigrants during the ﬁrst ﬁve
years of residency is roughly the same in these two speciﬁcations, about 26 to 30
% higher than the level of comparable natives. This discrepancy is more than cut
in half in the following ﬁve years and reduced to about 5 to 8 % after more than
10 years. These last eﬀects are insigniﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. Controlling for
having immigrated at compulsory school age has no signiﬁcant impact.
In columns (3) and (4), we additionally control for the skill requirements of the
job by a set of dummies, omitting No Training required as the base group. The
probability of a mismatch in the full sample, depicted in column (3), is lowest for
jobs requiring vocational training. This stresses the high entry barriers to these
jobs on the German labor market. Also employment in jobs requiring academic
degrees is very unlikely without the adequate education. The more interesting ef-
fect from the perspective of this analysis, however, is the fact that the majority of
immigrants now no longer is signiﬁcantly more prone to job mismatches than na-
tives. Once again dropping respondents currently in vocational training in column
(4) does not change these main results. However, the impact for young immigrants
drops sharply from 14 to 1 % yet is measured imprecisely in both speciﬁcations.
The ﬁndings in columns (1) and (2) support our hypotheses about an initially
higher probability of a job mismatch for immigrants which is reduced with years of
residence in the host society. However, taking into account job quality measured
by the required skills, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between immigrants of German
ethnicity and German natives remains. This is another very positive sign of the
ability of this particular immigration group to ﬁnd its way into the German labor
market, probably partially explainable by the oﬃcial recognition of their educa-
tional degrees.
174.2 Wage Assimilation
The ﬁnal results of our study concern the impacts of the outcomes analyzed above
on the wage assimilation of ethnic German immigrants. As a benchmark, we report
the relative eﬀects of the immigration indicators in a standard Mincer-type wage
regression in column (1) of Table 3.22 The estimates suggest that the average wage
disadvantage of immigrants during the ﬁrst ﬁve years in the country is 17.5 %, is
cut in half in the following ﬁve years and remains constant thereafter. Immigrants
who entered the country at compulsory school age seem to face a considerably
lower wage gap.23 However, the reduction of about 6 % is estimated very impre-
cisely. Hence, it appears as if a substantial initial disadvantage was present for
the majority of ethnic German immigrants which is reduced considerably within
the ﬁrst decade in the host country. Nonetheless, a permanent wage discrepancy
of about 9 % seems to remain. Overall, almost two thirds of the wage discrepancy
between natives and immigrants in the raw data is explained by socio-economic
and job-speciﬁc characteristics.
A job mismatch reduces wages on average by about 3 % as is shown in column
(2). This rather small point estimate might reﬂect the ﬁndings reported in the
last two columns of Table 2. These suggest that mismatches mainly occur in the
low-skilled sector where probably the wage gap induced by lacking the required
skills is rather small. Since immigrants are more prone to mismatches as long
as required job qualiﬁcations are ignored, it could further be expected that the
wage gap between natives and immigrants is exaggerated. We ﬁnd that adding
22The relative eﬀect of switching an indicator variable k from 0 to 1 on wages is computed
as exp(ˆ βk) − 1 following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) with ˆ βk denoting the OLS parameter
estimate.
23There are three reasons why we would expect younger immigrants to be diﬀerent in terms
of wage diﬀerentials than the majority of immigrants. With years since migration we capture
unobservable eﬀects that inﬂuence labor income of immigrants. For each additional year on
the labor market, due to not explicitly speciﬁed mechanisms, immigrants are assumed to catch
up to natives on average. However, this measure is misleading for those immigrants entering
the country as children since they spend a substantial part of their time in the host society in
full-time education before they enter the labor market. A negative parameter estimate therefore
could be interpreted as the correction of the systematic measurement error of their potential
labor market experience captured by the years since migration indicators. A second eﬀect,
supposedly with the opposite sign, should be that they obtain German degrees which in turn
should be fully recognized on the labor market, eliminating one of the obstacles typically faced
by immigrants. Furthermore, during their time at school they should on average obtain better
reading and writing skills than the older immigrants which in turn should be rewarded on the
labor market (Dustmann, 1994).
18the mismatch dummy to the wage regression yields only very small reductions of
this discrepancy at all points in time compared to column (1). Considering the
small impact of job mismatches on wages this is, however, not surprising.
Column (3) exhibits the impact of controlling for skill requirements. As ex-
pected, wages increase with required qualiﬁcations, though not completely mono-
tonically. Furthermore, the wage gaps at all three points in time are reduced
considerably compared to column (1). Finally, in column (4) we control for both
factors simultaneously. Looking at the control variables, the mismatch indicator is
closer to zero and loses signiﬁcance. This is not totally surprising since we further
control for skill requirements and years of education, the two factors determin-
ing the incidence of a job mismatch. The impacts of required qualiﬁcations are
basically unchanged. Furthermore, the ﬁnal picture of the wage assimilation is
virtually unchanged compared to column (3). On average, the wage gap amounts
to 13.2 % during the ﬁrst ﬁve years. It is then reduced to merely 5 % in the
following ﬁve years to ﬁnally increases again to 6.6 % after more than 10 years in
the country. The diﬀerence between the last two eﬀects is however not signiﬁcant,
hinting at a permanent wage disadvantage of ethnic German immigrants of 5 to
7 %. As mentioned above, our estimation strategy does not allow us to predict
whether this eﬀect will remain or might disappear after some more years on the
host labor market.
The point estimate of the younger group indicator is slightly positive, yet, as in
all speciﬁcations, insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Hence, no apparent diﬀerence
in wage assimilation between immigrants who entered at compulsory school age
vis-à-vis the majority of immigrants can be found. Yet, this implies that ﬁnishing
school education in the host country reduces the initial wage disadvantage faced
by the majority of ethnic Germans substantially since younger immigrants are on
average already 10.6 years in the country when they are hired for the ﬁrst time. In
fact, F-tests of the joint signiﬁcance of Under 16 and being in the country for up
to ten years and more than ten years, respectively, reject this nul at any reason-
able signiﬁcance level in all four speciﬁcations.24 Hence, we conclude that ethnic
German immigrants who enter the country at compulsory school age on average
are indistinguishable from natives when they enter the labor market.
Overall, our ﬁndings seem to be roughly in line with the last hypothesis from
Section 2.2. The strong link between vocational education and job accessibil-
ity hampers considerably the transferability of human capital acquired in foreign
24Only one of the young immigrants enters the labor market within the ﬁrst ﬁve years of
residency in Germany.
19countries. Especially, controlling for skill requirements of jobs helps to explain a
signiﬁcant part of the estimated wage assimilation proﬁle of immigrants. To assess
the full impact of the allocation mechanism, we compare the proﬁle from column
(4) to the estimates in column (1). The initial wage diﬀerential is reduced by 24
%, the average gap after 6 to 10 years diminishes by as much as 43 %. Finally, the
discrepancy after more than a decade is reduced by 26 %.
5 Conclusion
In this study we assess the impact of job entry restrictions on the economic integra-
tion of ethnic German immigrants who entered Germany after the fall of the iron
curtain using eleven waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Start-
ing from the theory of human capital transferability (Chiswick, 1978) we derive
hypotheses why immigrants should face disadvantages vis-à-vis natives on labor
markets that closely link job access to speciﬁc vocational education. We further
argue that these handicaps should vanish with years of residence in the host coun-
try. To evaluate these claims we analyze the job mismatch probability as well as
the employment probabilities in jobs that vary by the type of qualiﬁcations they
require. In a second step of our analysis we investigate how controlling for these
two factors aﬀects estimates of the wage assimilation proﬁle of immigrants.
Our ﬁndings in general conﬁrm the derived hypothesis concerning job entry
restrictions. Ethnic Germans face a substantially higher job mismatch probability
which however disappears after on average slightly more than ten years in the
country. Furthermore, this excess propensity is virtually completely determined
by the jobs immigrants are employed at along their career. While, as predicted,
they are more likely than natives to be hired in employment requiring low formal
training during the ﬁrst years after arrival, subsequently they climb the job lad-
der to levels very close to those of natives. Since mismatch rates are highest for
low skilled jobs, this job transition renders the entire mismatch proﬁle insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we assess the wage assimilation of ethnic German immigrants towards
natives. Our results suggest that the wage gaps along the earnings proﬁle are
reduced considerably when we control for the three previously analyzed factors.
We estimate that an average earnings disadvantage of 13.2 % in the ﬁrst ﬁve years
in Germany diminishes to slightly more than 5 % after more than a decade in the
host society. This discrepancy seems to have permanent character since we don’t
ﬁnd evidence for further assimilation for immigrants having spent more than 10
years in the country. A last important ﬁnding is that immigrants who entered
Germany at compulsory school age and consequently received their school degrees
20in the host society on average are undistinguishable from natives when they enter
the labor market. This completes the, in our view, relatively positive picture of the
labor market integration of ethnic German immigrants who entered the country
since the fall of the iron curtain.
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Table 1 - Required Qualifications
ordered probit marginal effects
A. Full Sample
P(y=1) P(y=2) P(y=3) P(y=4) P(y=5) P(y=6) P(y=7)
Years since Migration
1 to 5 0.0127 0.0828** 0.1074** 0.0560** -0.1606* -0.0557** -0.0425**
(0.0072) (0.0323) (0.0289) (0.0105) (0.0680) (0.0071) (0.0043)
6 to 10 0.0068** 0.0531** 0.0783** 0.0448** -0.0964** -0.0480** -0.0386**
(0.0020) (0.0113) (0.0133) (0.0065) (0.0253) (0.0049) (0.0034)
More than 10 0.0025* 0.0241** 0.0412** 0.0262** -0.0338* -0.0322** -0.0281**
(0.0010) (0.0077) (0.0115) (0.0067) (0.0159) (0.0065) (0.0047)
Under 16 -0.0009** -0.0138** -0.0337** -0.0277** -0.0660 0.0593** 0.0829*
(0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0387) (0.0186) (0.0347)
41,533 Observations, Pseudo R-Squared: 0.290.
B. Individuals currently in vocational training excluded
P(y=1) P(y=2) P(y=3) P(y=4) P(y=5) P(y=6) P(y=7)
Years since Migration
1 to 5 0.0110 0.0793* 0.1059** 0.0555** -0.1512* -0.0573** -0.0432**
(0.0066) (0.0328) (0.0305) (0.0112) (0.0693) (0.0078) (0.0046)
6 to 10 0.0064** 0.0536** 0.0802** 0.0455** -0.0957** -0.0503** -0.0397**
(0.0020) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0067) (0.0263) (0.0052) (0.0036)
More than 10 0.0020* 0.0215** 0.0382** 0.0244** -0.0273 -0.0315** -0.0274**
(0.0009) (0.0074) (0.0116) (0.0068) (0.0147) (0.0070) (0.0050)
Under 16 -0.0007** -0.0108** -0.0260** -0.0206* -0.0355 0.0417 0.0520
(0.0002) (0.0034) (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0334) (0.0218) (0.0330)
39,865 Observations, Pseudo R-Squared: 0.294.
Robust, cluster-adjusted standard errors in brackets, ∗∗, ∗: signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% level. Year, State,
and Occupation Dummies included in both models. Further Controls: Years of Schooling, Firm Size,
Work Hours, Part-Time indicator, Tenure, Age, Number of HH Members (Kids), Marital Status.
25Table 2 - Job Mismatch
probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Migration
1 to 5 0.2641** 0.3037** 0.0271 0.0846
(0.0920) (0.0954) (0.1067) (0.1052)
6 to 10 0.1288* 0.1329* -0.0521 -0.0637
(0.0550) (0.0577) (0.0615) (0.0613)
More than 10 0.0516 0.0828 -0.0843 -0.0491
(0.0544) (0.0556) (0.0537) (0.0542)
Under 16 -0.0168 -0.0728 0.1441 0.0105
(0.0759) (0.0826) (0.0899) (0.1091)
Required Qualiﬁcation
Job Introduction -0.0083 -0.0071
(0.0479) (0.0491)




Vocational Training -0.4720** -0.4778**
(0.0388) (0.0398)




Observations 41,533 39,865 41,533 39,865
Pseudo R-Squared 0.199 0.203 0.346 0.363
Robust, cluster-adjusted standard errors in brackets, ∗∗, ∗: signiﬁcant
at the 1%, 5% level. Year, State, and Occupation Dummies included in
each model. Further Controls: Years of Schooling, Firm Size, Work Hours,
Part-Time indicators, Tenure, Age, Number of HH Members (Kids),
Marital Status.
26Table 3 - Wage Regressions
pooled ols, relative effects of indicator variables reported
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Migration
1 to 5 -0.1748** -0.1610** -0.1335** -0.1322**
(0.0363) (0.0386) (0.0460) (0.0463)
6 to 10 -0.0877** -0.0816** -0.0489* -0.0498*
(0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0222) (0.0222)
More than 10 -0.0892** -0.0845** -0.0657* -0.0663*
(0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0287)
Under 16 0.0631 0.0584 0.0285 0.0297
(0.0489) (0.0484) (0.0471) (0.0471)
Job Mismatch -0.0288** -0.0172
(0.0098) (0.0101)
Required Qualiﬁcation
Job Introduction 0.0447 0.0447
(0.0320) (0.0320)




Vocational Training 0.1094** 0.1020**
(0.0356) (0.0359)




R-Squared 0.653 0.655 0.663 0.663
Robust, cluster-adjusted standard errors in brackets, ∗∗, ∗: signiﬁcant at the
1%, 5% level, 41,533 Observations. Year, State, and Occupation Dummies
included in each model. Further Controls: Years of Schooling, Firm Size,
Work Hours, Part-Time and Vocational Training indicators,Tenure, Age,
Number of HH Members (Kids), Marital Status.
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